Ukraine's Long Goodby
A Tragedy in Three Acts
Dispensing with the details of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ill-fated visit to Washington, it is necessary to turn directly to the substantive issue at hand: the trajectory of Ukraine’s political future. 1 At this pivotal moment, the question of whether or not Zelensky will capitulate and formalize the long-contested minerals agreement has become largely irrelevant. His continued tenure as Ukraine’s head of state is not secured by electoral legitimacy but rather by the Ukrainian Parliament’s routine extension of martial law. This extra-constitutional mechanism suspends electoral processes under the pretext of national security.
A critical juncture emerged on February 24, when Zelensky failed to secure the requisite 226-vote parliamentary majority—despite his own party, Servant of the People, holding the numerical advantage—to extend his presidential mandate. Bill 13039 fell short by a margin of eight votes. 2 Although the measure ultimately passed in a subsequent vote two days later, the initial failure signified an alarming political reality: Zelensky’s grip on power is progressively uncertain, and dissent within his own ranks is no longer a theoretical concern but a demonstrable political liability. 3 The episode served as a stark warning to both Zelensky and his allies that the parliamentary acquiescence he has thus far relied upon may no longer be assured.
His hold on the presidency has been prolonged through the end of May, yet this may well mark the final act of his increasingly untenable administration. By the year’s end, Ukraine will either have a new president or face an existential crisis of such magnitude that the nation itself may cease to function in any meaningful sense. Previously, I conducted a cursory review of Ukraine’s opaque emergency rule framework and its role in indefinitely postponing elections. 4 However, the true legal quagmire lies not in the suspension of elections but in their eventual resumption—an issue for which no definitive legal framework exists.
Two competing interpretations have emerged. The first holds that presidential elections must take place within four to six months after wartime governance is lifted, with parliamentary elections following within two to four months thereafter. The second, far more troubling, contends that there is no explicit constitutional or statutory mechanism to transition out of the current state of emergency—effectively rendering Ukraine’s political future an open-ended legal void.
The rosiest projection envisions martial law expiring before June, followed by presidential elections sometime between August and November and parliamentary elections in early 2026. Yet every conceivable pessimistic scenario—far more plausible given the current political climate—entails either a renewed seizure of power or the further fragmentation of Ukraine’s already tenuous territorial integrity.
The Russian military now holds a decisive advantage on the battlefield, pressing forward relentlessly across the entire front. 5 Compounding Ukraine’s deteriorating position is the fallout from the globally televised diplomatic debacle between President Donald Trump and President Volodymyr Zelensky during their recent Oval Office meeting. 6 In the wake of that meeting, Ukraine is increasingly at risk of losing access to American intelligence and targeting data. This operational setback would severely hinder its capacity to anticipate Russian maneuvers and conduct strikes against high-value targets deep within Russian territory.
The longer Ukraine remains trapped in its state of martial law-induced paralysis, the more pronounced Russia’s tactical superiority becomes. Even under the most optimistic scenario, where Ukraine manages to hold presidential elections by the year’s end, the intervening months will see continued Russian advances unchecked by political stability or coordinated military resistance. The likelihood that Russia will fully consolidate control over the four regions it annexed in late 2022 grows with each passing day—particularly as the prospect of a ceasefire remains elusive.
While President Zelensky continues to enjoy vocal backing from European Union allies, such support remains largely symbolic. 7 The EU persists in supplying Ukraine with its remaining stockpiles of aging military hardware, which, while marginally beneficial, fails to address Ukraine’s most critical shortfall: manpower. No amount of external assistance can resolve Ukraine’s worsening deficit of combat personnel.
Kyiv’s progressively unpopular forced mobilization efforts have proven insufficient to offset the relentless attrition on the battlefield. Meanwhile, Russia has expanded its military ranks with nearly half a million contract soldiers in 2024 alone—an overwhelming numerical advantage that Ukraine has no means of countering. The collapse of Ukraine’s war effort is no longer a matter of speculation but of timing, and that moment is approaching with accelerating certainty.
The Russians have undoubtedly conducted their own analysis of Ukraine’s electoral timeline—likely with far greater depth and precision than my own. They are fully aware that they have until the year’s end to maximize their military advantage, and recent statements from Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov leave little doubt that Russia remains committed to securing full control over the four annexed Ukrainian regions.
However, the greater strategic concern lies elsewhere: the Odessa and Mykolaiv regions. Three years into this war, these territories have remained largely untouched by large-scale hostilities, but that status quo is hardly guaranteed to persist. Should Ukraine lose Odessa and Mykolaiv, it would be stripped of its access to the Black Sea—an outcome that would render the country not only strategically vulnerable but also geopolitically irrelevant. Without maritime access, Ukraine ceases to function as a meaningful regional power, and its broader viability as an independent state becomes tenuous at best.
Ukraine’s territorial integrity is no longer a viable objective by any metric. The notion of preserving Ukrainian sovereignty remains theoretically possible, but the window for achieving even that is closing fast. The ill-fated minerals deal with the United States could have at least guaranteed Ukraine’s continued existence, albeit in a diminished form—more akin to a resource-extraction colony with a national flag than a fully sovereign state. However, that arrangement collapsed, leaving Ukraine politically and strategically adrift.
Despite this failure, it remains likely that Zelensky’s envoys will ultimately return to Washington, concessions in hand, to finalize the agreement—effectively placing Ukraine’s remaining assets under the control of American corporate interests. But by then, the damage will be done. Precious time will have been lost, and Russia, ever opportunistic, will undoubtedly exploit this delay to consolidate further territorial and strategic gains.
By mid-to-late 2026, Ukraine as we know it will be a relic of the past. What emerges in its place will be a diminished state—smaller, chastened, and fractured beyond recognition. Stripped of its territorial expanse, geopolitical relevance, and much of its agency, this new Ukraine will exist not as a sovereign force but as the mere vestige of a nation, clinging to what remains amid the wreckage of lost wars and broken alliances.
Knudsen, Hannah. "Trump Kicks Out Zelensky, White House Staff Eats His Lunch." Breitbart, 28 Feb. 2025, www.breitbart.com/politics/2025/02/28/trump-kicks-out-zelensky-white-house-staff-eats-his-lunch.
Dpa. "Ukrainian parliament rejects resolution supporting Zelensky." Yahoo News, 24 Feb. 2025, www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-parliament-rejects-resolution-supporting-183319758.html?guccounter=1.
Ryan Huang | Lincoln Alexander School of Law, C. A. "Ukraine parliament affirms no elections during wartime under martial law." - JURIST - News, 27 Feb. 2025, www.jurist.org/news/2025/02/ukraine-parliament-affirms-no-elections-during-wartime-under-martial-law.
Venik. "Ballots, Bullets, and Bullshit." Let Me Tell You..., 23 Feb. 2025, venik.substack.com/p/ballots-bullets-and-bullshit.
Méheut, Constant, et al. "As Russia Talks Peace, Moscow Threatens New Ukraine Region." N.Y. Times, 21 Feb. 2025, www.nytimes.com/2025/02/21/world/europe/russia-ukraine-peace-talks.html.
Weissert, Will, et al. "Zelenskyy leaves White House without signing minerals deal." AP News, 1 Mar. 2025, apnews.com/article/zelenskyy-security-guarantees-trump-meeting-washington-eebdf97b663c2cdc9e51fa346b09591d.
Balk, Tim. "European Leaders Rally Around Zelensky After Explosive Meeting With Trump." N.Y. Times, 1 Mar. 2025, www.nytimes.com/2025/02/28/us/politics/trump-zelensky-europe-leaders.html.