French Mirage and Ukrainian Reality

The art of losing twice.

The new year has begun with a series of defeatist headlines in Western media regarding the situation on the Russian front, accompanied by gloomy predictions about its likely developments. This newfound sense of realism sharply contrasts with the childlike enthusiasm that the Western media displayed two years ago about Ukraine's anticipated spring counteroffensive. The much-touted military operation came and went, with the Ukrainian assault brigades barely inching forward before being decimated by the Russian defenses.

What was intended as a spring counteroffensive but postponed until early June succeeded in advancing only seven and a half kilometers, forming a small pocket that is hardly noticeable on a map, and lost momentum before it could ever reach the main defensive lines of the Russian army. The operation's utter failure was self-evident by the end of June, but the mainstream media refused to acknowledge this fact until December, when more realistic analyses were finally published.

It has since emerged that the Ukrainian brass felt rushed by Washington into launching a poorly conceived and premature counteroffensive. The infamous April 2023 Pentagon classified data leaks, attributed to a junior U. S. air force serviceman who wasn't even supposed to have access to this information, were widely seen in Ukraine as deliberate and designed to pressure the country into launching the counterassault as quickly as possible. Caught in a vice between his generals pushing for a delay in the operation and the foreign handlers advocating for immediate action, Zelensky was compelled to align with those who were signing his paychecks.

The year 2023 ended with a Russian assault across the entire so-called line of contact, continuing into the following year and growing in intensity. In early August 2024, the Ukrainian army launched a highly risky operation in the border area of Russia’s Kursk region, attempting to redirect some Russian assault units from critical spots in Donbass to the border between the Sumy and Kursk regions. It is also commonly believed that the invasion of Russian territory had the additional goal of gaining leverage in any upcoming peace talks. Neither goal was achieved, and the operation became a massive drain on the Ukrainian army’s resources, allowing for faster Russian advances in Donbass.

Having been a soap opera star, Zelensky often prioritizes appearances over depth and frequently chooses to double down on a losing strategy. On January 5, 2025, the Ukrainian army launched another armored assault on Russian positions in the Kursk region. Unlike the August attempt, this operation lacked the element of surprise and encountered much better-prepared Russian defenses. Once again, Ukraine was attempting to wage armored warfare on an open plain with limited road infrastructure and overwhelming enemy air superiority. Within hours, this latest effort to create drama in Kursk fizzled out, resulting in heavy casualties for the Ukrainian army and a handful of abandoned border villages being contested.

The repeat attack by Ukraine in this general area was anticipated and discussed by Russian military analysts for weeks. Ukrainian preparations did not go unnoticed, but the question remained whether Kiev’s plan follows a conservative approach to re-engaging in Kursk or embarks on a risky trajectory by opening up new ground in the nearby Bryansk or Belgorod regions. A second assault on Kursk carries little PR value for Zelensky, regardless of the outcome. Additionally, there is no hope that this latest attack would succeed in shifting Russian forces from Donbass any more than the original assault did. This was a pragmatic strategy aimed at retaining some of the territorial gains from the August offensive for future negotiations.

Zelensky being pragmatic? The times seem to be changing. Some directional movement on the peace talks front is expected around March. Ukraine needs to survive long enough and hold enough cards to maximize the negotiations. Launching a follow-up in Kursk and lowering the conscription age limit into adolescence are last-ditch measures. The news of the renewed Kursk offensive was met with even less optimism from Western media than the original operation. Even Ukrainian parliament members expressed dismay. "This is a tragedy—next will be Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv," stated Ukrainian lawmaker Maryana Bezuhla in sharp criticism of the AFU's new offensive in the Kursk region.

Russian forces are seizing control of our natural resources, taking over abandoned fortifications that suit them perfectly, killing soldiers, and advancing dozens of kilometers deep into our territory. Soon, very soon, it will be 'Fortress Pokrovsk,' which is no fortress at all.

It seems military and political priorities are not aligned with defending Ukraine's Dnipro-Donetsk resource cluster, saving cities and lives, or reforming the army. Instead, generals are focused on showcasing yet another 'forward, forward' campaign to prove their indispensability and competence to political leadership. They exploit fleeting euphoria and public hope to maintain their positions while avoiding necessary changes and concealing their crimes. In 2023, it was the southern offensive, and in 2024, it's Kursk."

The unsustainable cost and ultimate futility of Zelensky’s Kursk misadventure appears obvious to many. This is not a winning strategy; it's a delaying tactic. The current second round in Kursk is unlikely to be the end of the story. While the second attack in Kursk was entirely expected, it occurred much earlier than anticipated, raising doubts about whether this is the real thing or merely a distraction. Here’s what makes me think that there will be a followup.

Starting January 1, 2025, Ukraine has abolished medical commissions for conscripts, effectively allowing all eligible individuals to be sent to the front lines without medical restrictions. The army needs fresh bodies to fill the many gaps in its defenses while its best troops are exploring the Kursk border region. France has confirmed the imminent delivery of Mirage 2000 fighter jets to Ukraine, which likely includes the deployment of pilots alongside the aircraft. The U.S. Treasury, moving with extraordinary speed ahead of the return of the Trump administration, has approved $5.9 billion in aid to Ukraine. The first phase of this package, under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, has already initiated the shipment of military equipment and ammunition to Ukraine. The nature of the supplied equipment strongly suggests preparations for offensive operations.

The AFU command has issued orders to position 18 newly formed and fully equipped brigades across the Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Poltava regions. Concurrently, numerous assault units have either completed or are nearing the end of their training in NATO countries. These units have either not participated in combat at all or have seen limited engagement, indicating a strategic reserve for upcoming operations.

This brings us to the subject of Ukraine's highly publicized 155th Mechanized Brigade, trained and armed by France, and recently thrown into combat around Pokrovsk. Even before the brigade fired its first shot, some 1,700 soldiers abandoned their posts without authorization. Following this, investigators from the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI) were tasked with conducting a thorough inquiry into the incident.

One of the officials responsible for forming the brigade died of a heart attack, while the brigade commander was dismissed immediately after the unit entered combat. The brigade’s training cost approximately $900 million, and the unit's first fifty desertions occurred in France. Before deployment, over 2,550 soldiers were reassigned from the brigade to reinforce other units. As a result, out of the 1,924 personnel sent to France for training, 1,414 had only recently enlisted and had served for less than two months.

Essentially, Ukraine's Ground Forces Command and the "West" Operational Command dispatched not a well-structured and unified military unit suitable for effective training, but instead a collection of individuals wearing military uniforms. This assembly constituted approximately 30% of the brigade's total manpower and was anticipated to utilize the training period to build internal organization, get to know each other, and become familiar with their leaders.

When the brigade returned to Ukraine, its leader, Dmitry Ryumshyn—an experienced commander—was dismissed because fifty soldiers had deserted while they were in France. New leaders were assigned to the brigade, even though they were unfamiliar with its internal dynamics or the personnel involved. This led to an increase in leadership disarray, a further decline in operational oversight, and during the first week of December—before the brigade saw any combat—there were 198 more instances of unauthorized absences. The brigade's elements were deployed into battle near Pokrovsk without adequate coordination or preparation. Furthermore, they lacked UAVs and electronic warfare systems, leading to considerable losses in personnel.

The recent events involving Ukraine’s 155th Brigade may shed light on why Ukrainian leaders opted to bolster the ongoing Kursk operation instead of initiating conflicts in adjacent areas. Zelensky often employs the strategy of creating a diversion when significant losses seem unavoidable. In this case, the impending loss of Pokrovsk and Kurakhovo prompted an escalation of the Kursk operation as a form of distraction. However, this diversion campaign does not eliminate the possibility of a more extensive operation being planned, as Ukraine requires several months before there is any substantial movement on the diplomatic front, while the Kursk operation will only offer a few days.